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This paper reinterprets the γ -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as 
well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition 
formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are 
farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the 
coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then 
shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have 
incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the γ - 
characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure. 
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The concept of a characteristic function which specifies the worth of each coalition is 
central to the theory of cooperative games. The worth of a coalition is what it can achieve 
on its own without the cooperation of the nonmembers. If there are no externalities, i.e., if 
the payoffs to the members of a coalition do not depend on the actions of the 
nonmembers, then the worth can be defined without specifying the actions of the 
nonmembers. But if externalities are present, then in order to calculate the worth of a 
coalition one must also predict the actions of the nonmembers. This has been however a 
disputed issue and alternative assumptions in this respect lead to different concepts of 
characteristic functions such as the α-, β-, and γ - characteristic functions.
3   
 
The γ- characteristic function was introduced most recently by Chander and Tulkens 
(1995, 1997) based on an assumption concerning the behavior of the nonmembers which 
is more plausible than those considered previously. They consider a game in strategic 
form with transferable utility in which it is efficient for the grand coalition to form and 
choose the strategy profile that maximizes the joint surplus. They assume that when a 
coalition forms it neither takes as given the strategies of its complement, as in the case of 
strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria, nor does it presume that the complement 
would follow minimax or maximin strategies, as in the case of the α - and β - 
characteristic functions, instead it looks forward to the best reply payoff corresponding to 
the equilibrium that its actions would induce. More specifically, when a coalition S forms 
it assumes that the nonmembers would not take any particular coalitional action against 
it, but would adopt only their individually best reply strategies. This results into a Nash 
equilibrium between the coalition S and the nonmembers acting individually, with the 
                                                 
3 These have been studied and contrasted to each other in various externalities contexts by Scarf (1971), 
Starret (1972), and Maler (1989) and in the public goods context by Foley (1970), Roberts (1974), Moulin 
(1987), and Chander (1993) among others. It is well-known that because of the underlying minimax or 
maximin assumptions, the α - and β - characteristic functions may lead to large cores. In fact, as noted by 
Maler (1989) and Ray and Vohra (1997), in some cases the α - and β - cores may include the whole set of 
Pareto optima.    2
members of S playing their joint best response strategies to the individual best response 
strategies of the nonmembers. The assumption that the nonmembers act individually is 
justified by Chander and Tulkens (1997, fn.6, p.387) by showing that if the nonmembers 
form one or more non-singleton coalitions then the payoff of S defined by the resulting 
Nash equilibrium across the coalitions would only be higher. Therefore, the assumption 
that the nonmembers act individually is equivalent to granting S a certain degree of 
pessimism.
4 In other words, S presumes the worst possible coalition structure which is 
that the nonmembers will not form any non-singleton coalitions.
5 Thus, the assumption is 
not concerning which coalitions will form, but rather which coalitions the coalition S 
thinks will or will not form. The uncertainty regarding the emerging coalition structure 
after the deviation is thus resolved by assuming that the coalition S presumes the coalition 
structure which is worst from its point of view. Chander and Tulkens (1997) show that 
the so-defined γ -characteristic function implies stability of the grand coalition in at least 
the games they consider. 
 
This stability result has been contrasted with the inefficiency results obtained in the 
theory of coalition formation (see e.g. Ray and Vohra (1997), and Yi (1997)). In 
particular, this stability result has been attributed to the γ -theory assumption that the 
nonmembers do not form any non-singleton coalitions. It has been claimed that this is an 
arbitrary assumption and that which coalitions will be formed by the nonmembers after 
the deviation by a coalition should be determined endogenously, as in the coalition 
formation theory, and not assumed exogenously.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to reinterpret theγ -core and justify it as well as its prediction 
that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory.  
                                                 
4 This is pessimism of a different sort: it is not concerning the strategies that will be adopted by the non-
members (as in the case of α - and β - characteristic functions), but about the coalition structures that will 
emerge.  
5 Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) consider games that imply positive externalities from coalition 
formation. For games that imply negative externalities from coalition formation, the corresponding 
assumption underlying the γ -characteristic function is that S assumes that the coalition N \ S would  form 
and its members would adopt the best response joint strategies. See Yi (1997) for the classification of 
games that imply positive or negative externalities from coalition formation.   3
Though the γ -core has been applied to games that are not necessarily symmetric, we 
consider here, as in the coalition formation theory, mainly symmetric games. 
Furthermore, in order to be more concrete, we consider the original economic model of 
Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) with identical agents. We show that if coalitions can 
freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate 
payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to 
gain from it, then the nonmembers will actually not form any non-singleton coalitions, as 
is assumed in the definition of theγ - characteristic function, and the grand coalition is the 
only stable coalition structure. We thus justify the γ -core by showing that both its 
assumptions and predictions are consistent with the coalition formation theory. 
 
The contents of this paper are as follows. We begin in section 2 with a simple example 
that illustrates the γ -theory and its relationship with the coalition formation theory. In 
section 3, we introduce the general model and the concept of indirect dominance. Section 
4 presents the main results. Section 5 draws the conclusion.  
 
2. The Illustrative Example 
 
Consider an economy consisting of three identical countries or agents. Let 
} 3 , 2 , 1 { = N denote the set of these agents. There are two kinds of commodities: a 
standard private good, whose quantities are denoted by , y  and an environmental good (in 
fact, a bad), whose quantities are denoted by z. The private and the environmental good 
can be produced by the agents according to the following rules:  
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where  i e  is to be interpreted as the emissions of country i. The preferences of country i  
are represented by the utility function: 
 
                                    . , ) , ( N i z y z y u i i i ∈ − =                                                                   
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We consider the strategic form game ] , , [ u T N . We assume that there are no transfers 
among the members of a coalition and they all get equal payoffs.
6 We also assume that a 
coalition deviates if and only if it stands to strictly gain from it. 
 
Standard arguments show that the game  ] , , [ u T N  has a unique Nash equilibrium which 
induces the following state of the economy 
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where  T e e e ∈ ) , , ( 3 2 1 are the Nash equilibrium strategies. It is easily seen that a Pareto 
efficient state of the economy is given by 
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and that the emission levels are the same for all Pareto efficient states. We claim that the 






1 e e e  belong to the γ -core. Since the players are identical, we need to 
consider only two types of deviations, namely: a deviation by a coalition of any two 
players, say  } 2 , 1 { and a deviation by a coalition of any single player, say  }. 3 {  
 
Define ) ~ , ~ , ~ ( 3 2 1 e e e  such that  2 1
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The strategies  ) ~ , ~ , ~ ( 3 2 1 e e e represent the Nash equilibrium between the coalitions 
}. 3 {   and   } 2 , 1 {  Comparing the payoffs of the coalition  } 2 , 1 { under the strategies  ) ~ , ~ , ~ ( 3 2 1 e e e   
 
                                                 
6 Ray and Vohra (1999) provide a justification for the assumption of equal sharing of coalition gain among 
the coalition members. In an infinite-horizon model of coalition formation among symmetric players with 
endogenous bargaining, they show that in any equilibrium without delay there is equal sharing.    5






1 e e e , it is seen that the coalition {1, 2} will not gain from the deviation.
7  
 
We now consider deviation by } 3 {  which really brings into focus the saidγ -theory 
assumption.  When  {} 3 = S  deviates it presumes that  { } 2 , 1 \ = S N  will break up into 
singletons and the resulting equilibrium will be the Nash equilibrium between 
}, 2 {   and   {1}   , } 3 { which leads to the same payoffs as in (1). From a comparison of the 
payoffs in (1) and (2), it follows that coalition  } 3 {  will also not gain from its deviation. 






1 e e e  are in the γ -core of the strategic form 
game ] , , [ u T N . 
 
But why should the coalition {} 2 , 1  break up into singletons when {3} deviates? The 
stability of the grand coalition depends crucially on the answer to this question, as {3} 
will gain from its deviation if {1, 2} did not break up (see the payoffs of {3} in (3) and 
(2)) and hence would engage in deviation.  
 
 Let us consider first the argument against breaking up of {1, 2}:  If {3} deviates and {1, 
2} does not breakup into singletons, then the resulting equilibrium and the corresponding 
payoff of {1, 2} is as given in (3), which as seen from (1) is higher than what its payoff 
would be if it were to break up and induce the coalition structure ({1}, {2}, {3}). The 
coalition {1, 2} therefore should not break up. This argument however assumes implicitly  
either that the coalition structure ({1}, {2}, {3}) which emerges after the coalition {1, 2} 
breaks apart is final or that the coalition {1, 2} is myopic and is concerned only with its 
payoff at the next step.  
 
Ray and Vohra (1997) assume the coalitions to be farsighted, but preclude the possibility 
of coalition merging, that is, coalitions can only become finer and not coarser. This  
means that the coalition structure ({1}, {2}, {3}) is final as further deviations are, by 
assumption, ruled out. Their analysis, therefore, implies stability of the coalition structure 
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that alternatively the  α - and β - strategies imply   ∞ → 3
~ e and  . ~ , ~
2 1 ∞ − → u u    6
({1, 2}, {3}) and not of the grand coalition {1, 2, 3}. The coalition structure ({1, 2}, {3}) 
is also stable in terms of the coalition formation games considered by Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993) who assume the coalitions to be myopic.
8 The Ray and Vohra 
assumption that coalitions cannot merge, therefore, has similar implications as the 
assumption of myopia. 
 
Let us now introduce the possibility of coalition merging (Chander (1999) and 
Diamantoudi and Xue (2002)) in the above story. This creates the possibility of further 
continuations after the coalition {1, 2} breaks apart and the coalition structure ({1}, {2}, 
{3}) emerges. Indeed, the coalitions {1}, {2}, and {3} may merge and form the grand 
coalition {1, 2, 3} which gives to each merging coalition a higher payoff (compare the 
payoffs in (1) and (2)). Contrary to the argument discussed above, the farsighted coalition 
{1, 2} has an incentive to break up and induce the temporary structure ({1}, {2}, {3}) as 
that would then lead to the formation of the grand coalition and to payoffs for its 
members which are strictly higher than if it did not break up
9 (compare the payoff of {1, 
2} in (3) and (2)). Since the initial deviating coalition  } 3 { is farsighted, it would realize 
that its deviation will not benefit its members, as it would only lead back to the grand 
coalition via the breaking up of {1, 2} into singletons, and hence it will not engage in 
deviation. This implies stability of the grand coalition. 
 
The coalition formation theory considers alternative approaches to deal with the issue of 
multiple continuations after a single deviation (see e.g. Greenberg (1990), Chwe (1994), 
Ray and Vohra (1997) and Xue (1998)): the initial deviating coalitions may evaluate the 
subsequent other deviations in optimistic or pessimistic ways. For example, in the 
definition of the von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable set, a coalition deviates as 
long as this deviation might lead to some final outcome that benefits its members. In 
contrast, in the definition of the largest consistent set (Chwe (1994), a coalition deviates 
                                                 
8 See also d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz (1986) and Barrett (1994; 2003). 
9 Emergence of this type of coalition structures has been observed empirically. For instance, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can come into force only if all the current and potential nuclear powers 
sign it. Another case in point is the Kyoto Protocol. After the US refusal to be a party to the protocol, will 
the rest of the countries implement or abandon it? See Tulkens (1998) for an interesting discussion on the 
possibility of such coalition structures.   7
only if its members benefit from all final outcomes that its deviation may lead to. It is 
clear from the discussion above that the assumption underlying the γ -theory is in the 
same vein, as it is equivalent to assuming that a coalition engages in deviation if and only 
if its members strictly benefit from the outcome that gives the least payoffs from among 
all the final outcomes its deviation may lead to.
10 Any other final outcomes, even if they 
strictly benefit the deviating coalition, are irrelevant and the possibility of just one final 
outcome which does not strictly benefit the members of the deviating coalition is enough 
to deter it from deviation. 
 
We have illustrated by means of a simple example why after the deviation by a coalition 
S , the complement  S N \  may break up into singletons and deter the deviation. We now 
extend this argument to the general model. Some new complications arise that have been 
intentionally avoided by constructing a suitable example so that we could focus on the 
basic argument. However, our conclusions remain the same. 
 
3. The General Model 
 
Let  {} n N ,..., 2 , 1 =  be the set of identical agents and suppose that the private good and the 
environmental good can be produced by the agents according to the following general 
rules: 
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. 0 ) (   and   0 ) ( where < ′ ′ > ′ i i e g e g  As before,  i e  denotes the emissions of agent  . i  The 
preferences of agent iare represented by the utility function: 
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where . 0 ) (   and   0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ > ′ z v z v   
                                                 
10 There might seem to be an additional assumption underlying the γ - core which is that the deviating 
coalition is able to foresee the final outcome after the complement breaks apart. But this is not an additional 
assumption at all as the coalitions are assumed to be farsighted to begin with.    8
We assume that there exists a finite
0 e such that  ). ( ) 0 (   and   ) ( ) (
0 0 0 e v n g e v e g ′ > ′ ′ < ′  This 
assumption rules out corner solutions and ensures that the emissions of the utility 
maximizing agents are no higher than
0 e . 
 




1 n e e e be the Pareto efficient emissions. Then, the first order conditions imply                                  
                                   
                                    . ,   and ), ( ) (
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Let  , ), ( ) (
* * * N i z v e g u i i ∈ − =  be the corresponding payoffs.  
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strategic form game  ]. , , [ u T N  
 
Let  ) , , , ( 2 1 n e e e K denote the Nash equilibrium of the game ] , , [ u T N . Then, 
                                        
                                        . , , 2 , 1 ), ( ) ( n i e v e g
N j
j i K = ′ = ′ ∑
∈
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A partition of N is P =  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 m S S S  such that  N S j
m
j = =1 U  and for all Φ = ≠ j i S S j i I , . 
Let  j n denote the cardinality of j j j S n S =   i.e.,   , . Since the players are identical, we may 
denote coalition  j S  interchangeably by j n . Those partitions of N that consist of a 
possibly non-singleton coalition S followed by one or more coalitions of singletons are of 
particular interest. We denote such a partition simply by  . ) 1 , , 1 , 1 , ( K S  The finest partition 
of N consisting of all singletons is denoted by  ). 1 , , 1 , 1 ( K  We shall interchangeably refer 
to the partition  ) , , , ( 2 1 m S S S P K =  as the set of coalitions m S S S , , , 2 1 K , i.e., as 
}. , , , { 2 1 m S S S K   
   9
A partition P is called a coalition structure and let ℘ be the set of all coalition structures. 
The idea of non-cooperative play across coalitions in a coalition structure is captured in 
the following definition. 
 
Given a coalition structure P∈℘, the corresponding coalitional equilibrium is 
) ~ ..., , ~ , ~ ( 2 1 n e e e  defined as 
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First order conditions imply 
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j e z ~ ~ denote the 
total emissions corresponding to the coalitional equilibrium. Then,  j i i u z v e g u ~ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ~ < − ≡  
l k l k j n n S j S i z v e g > ∈ ∈ − ≡  with    and     if   ) ~ ( ) ~ ( , since   j i e e ~ ~ < . So the payoffs of the 
members of larger coalitions are lower. Furthermore, by comparing (8) with the 







* ~  if  N P ≠ . This leads to the 
following lemma 
 
     Lemma 1: The payoffs of the members of the largest coalition in a coalitional 
equilibrium are lower than their payoffs in the grand coalition, i.e., 
* ~
i i u u < for all 
.   all for    such that    j n n S i j k k ≥ ∈   
 
This lemma has the following two important implications: (a) Let  ) ˆ , , ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1 n e e e K  denote 
the coalitional equilibrium corresponding to the partition  N S N S ≠ with    of   ) 1 , , 1 , 1 , ( K  
and let  ) ˆ , , ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1 n u u u K  be the corresponding payoffs. Then, , for    ˆ
* S i u u i i ∈ <  and (b) 
i i i u N i u u    above,   as     where, , ,
* ∈ < ’s are the payoffs corresponding to the Nash 
equilibrium.   10
The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium as well as coalitional equilibria with 
respect to any given partition of N follow from standard arguments as the strategy sets are 
compact and convex and the payoff functions are concave (see e.g. Chander and Tulkens 
(1997)) 
  
Since the payoff of each player in a coalitional equilibrium depends on the entire 
coalition structure P, let  : i u ℘ R →  denote i’s payoff.  
 
Given a coalition structure, either a coalition may break up into smaller coalitions or 
several coalitions may merge into a larger coalition. This is expressed formally as 
follows: 
 
Given a coalition structure {} ∈ = m S S S P ,..., , 2 1 ℘, a collection of coalitions 
{} k T T T T ,..., , 2 1 =  induce a coalition structure  ∈ ′ P  ℘such that 
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This means that either P  is coarser than P′or P′ is coarser thanP . Note that any given  
coalition structure P′   can be induced from any other coalition structure P through a  
sequence of steps such as (i) and (ii).  
 
We will write  P P
T ′ →   to denote “T induces P′fromP ”. 
 
     Indirect Dominance
11: P′ indirectly dominatesP , if there exists a sequence of  
coalition structures  ∈
s P P P ,..., ,
2 1 ℘, where  P P =
1 and 
s P P = ′ , and a sequence of 
collection of coalitions 
1 2 1 ,..., ,
− s T T T such that for all  1 ,..., 2 , 1 − = s j  
                                                 
11 See also Harsanyi (1974), Chwe (1994) and Xue (1998).   11
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     (ii)  ) ( ) ( P u P u i
j
i ′ <  for each 
j
l T i∈ and 
j j
l T T ∈ . 
 
The indirect dominance relation captures the idea that farsighted coalitions consider the 
final coalition structure that their deviations may lead to, and that only those deviations 
that strictly benefit their members in the end are carried out. A coalition structure 
P′indirectly dominates P if P′can replace P through a sequence of  deviations such that 
at each step all deviators would be  better-off at the final coalition structure P′compared 
to the  status-quo they face.  
      
     Lemma 2: Let ) , , , ( 2 1 m S S S P K = be some coalition structure and let  P P = ′ be a 
coalition structure induced from P by a collection of coalitions  , } , , , { 2 1 k T T T T K =  
P P
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     Proof of Lemma 2: Let   ) ~ ..., , ~ , ~ ( 2 1 n e e e  and  ) , , , ( 2 1 n e e e ′ ′ ′ K  be the coalitional equilibrium 
strategies corresponding to P P ′   and   , respectively. Let  .   and   ~ ~ ∑ ∑
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But this contradicts our supposition that  . ~ z z ≤ ′ Hence  i i e e z z ~   and   ~ ≤ ′ > ′ for each 
} , 2 , 1 { ,
1
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k
i
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. This proves the lemma as this means   ) ( ) ( P u P u i i < ′  for 
} , 2 , 1 { ,
1
m j T S i
k
i
i j K U ∈ ≠ ∈
=
. 
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Lemma 2 implies that coalition formation results into positive externalities for other 
coalitions. Intuitively, when a coalition forms its members internalize the effect of their 
emissions on each other resulting into lower emissions which benefits the other coalitions 
as well. 
     
     Proposition 1: Let ) \ , ( S N S P =  for some  . N S ≠  Then,  N P = ′  indirectly 
dominates  . P   
 
     Proof of Proposition 1: There are two possible cases: either    \ S N S ≤ or 
S N \ S   > . Consider first S N S \ ≤ . Let  ) ~ , ~ , ~ ( , 2 1 n u u u K be the coalitional equilibrium 
payoffs corresponding to the partition  ). \ , ( S N S  Then, in view of Lemma 1, 
* ~
i i u u <  for 
all  . \ S N i∈ Furthermore, let   ) ˆ , , ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1 n u u u K  be the coalitional equilibrium payoffs 
corresponding to the partition  ). 1 , , 1 , 1 , ( K S  Then,  . for    ˆ
* S i u u i i ∈ <  Similarly, 
N i u u i i ∈ < for   
* where  i u ’s are the Nash equilibrium payoffs. Consider the sequence of 
partitions 
4 3 2 1 , , , P P P P  with )) \ , ( (
1 S N S P P = = , ), 1 , , 1 , 1 , (
2 K S P = ) 1 , , 1 , 1 (
3 K = P and 
.
4 N P =  Let ,
4 P P = ′  } \ : } { {
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(i)
1 + → 
j T j P P
j
 and  ) ( ) ( P u P u i
j
i ′ <  for each  . 3 , 2 , 1 , } { = ∈ j T i
j This proves that 
N P = ′  indirectly dominates  ). \ , ( S N S P =  
 
If  , \ S N S >  then by interchanging  S N S \   and   and applying the same argument as in 
the preceding paragraph, S  may break up into singletons first, followed by the breaking 
up of  S N \ , which would then lead to the formation of  . N  This completes the proof. 
 
Notice that in the first case  S N \ has incentives to break up into singletons before S does. 
This is consistent with the γ -assumption that  S N \  breaks up into singletons after S 
deviates. In the second case however  S N \  breaks up into singletons after S does and this 
may seem to be inconsistent with the γ -assumption, but it is not. The reason is that when   13
S N S \ > it does not matter whether or not  S N \ breaks up into singletons before S 
does. If  S N \ is assumed to breakup into singletons before S does then, in view of 
Lemma 2, the payoffs of members of S corresponding to  the resulting coalition structure 
) 1 , , 1 , 1 , ( K S would be even lower and S would still have incentives to break up into 
singletons. Therefore, assuming that  S N \ breaks up into singletons before S does is 
inconsequential when  S N S \ >  as it does not affect the final outcome. In other words, 
there is no loss of generality in assuming, as the γ - theory does, that  S N \ breaks up into 
singletons.   
 
As mentioned earlier the γ -theory is applicable to games that are not necessarily 
symmetric. Now in the asymmetric games, unlike the symmetric games, there is no 
relationship between the size of the coalition and the payoffs of its members, that is, ‘the 
size does not matter’. Therefore, in the asymmetric games there are no two distinct cases 
as in the proof of Proposition 1. There is just one case to deal with and only one 
assumption to make that can be applied uniformly to all deviating coalitions irrespective 
of their size. It therefore makes sense to assume that  S N \  breaks up into singletons no 
matter whether S is larger or smaller than S N \ .  
 
We postpone further discussion of the asymmetric games to later sections. For the time 
being we return to symmetric games. We show that there is in fact no coalition structure 
other than N  which is stable. 
      
     Proposition 2: Let  ∈ P ℘ be any coalition structure such that N P ≠ . Then,  N P = ′  
indirectly dominates  N P   and   is the only stable coalition structure. 
  
     Proof of Proposition 2: Let  ∈ P ℘ be some coalition structure. If  ) 1 , , 1 , 1 ( K = P , then 
P i u P u i i ∈ <   all for    ) (
*  and therefore  .
} : } {{ N P
N i i   → 
∈  If not, let  1
1 let    and   S P P ≡ be the 
largest coalition in 
1 P . Then, 
* 1
1 ) (   1,   Lemma   of   in view   and,   1 i i u P u S < >  for all  . 1 S i∈  
Now
2 } : } { { 1 1 P P
S i i   → 
∈ , where 
2 P  is the coalition structure in which  1 S  has been replaced   14
by the coalitions  }. : } { { 1 S i i ∈  If ) 1 , , 1 , 1 (
2 K ≠ P , then let  2 S be the largest coalition in
2 P . 
Then,  . for    ) (   and   1 2
* 2
2 S i u P u S i i ∈ < > Thus, 
3 } : } { { 2 2 P P
S i i   → 
∈ , where 
3 P is the coalition 
structure obtained by replacing  2 S by  }. : } { { 2 S i i ∈ We can continue in this fashion until 
we obtain  .   some for    ) 1 , , 1 , 1 ( k P
k K = This defines  a sequence of collections of coalitions 
k T T T , , ,
2 1 K such that 
k T T T P P P P
k
 →  →  → 
−1 2 1 3 2 1 L  and 
. , , 2 , 1 , } { each  for    ) (




i K = ∈ <  Since 
* } : } { { ) (   and   i
k
i
N i i k u P u N P <   → 
∈  for 
each  N i∈ , N  indirectly dominates  .
1 P  
 
We have shown that given any coalition structure N P ≠ , there will always be a deviation 
and that N  indirectly dominates every coalition structure  . N P ≠  This proves that  N  is 
the only stable coalition structure.  
 
Some remarks are in order. Chander (1999) proves the stability of the grand coalition for 
games with three players. Diamantoudi and Xue (2002) prove the stability of the grand 
coalition for games with more than three players. However, they obtain multiple vN-M 
stable sets and stability of some coalition structures other than the grand coalition. In 
their framework a farsighted coalition may not engage in deviation even if it stands to 
strictly gain from the deviation. 
 
4. The Asymmetric Case 
  
We show that the γ -core can be justified similarly in the context of the asymmetric 
games. We first prove a lemma and then discuss this issue in the concluding section. 
 
If the agents are not identical, equations (4) and (5) are modified as follows: 
   




i i i i e z N i e g y                                            (9) 
. 0 ) (   and   0 ) ( where < ′ ′ > ′ i i i i e g e g  As before,  i e  denotes the emissions of agent  . i  The 
preferences of agent iare represented by the utility function:   15
                                                   , , ) ( ) , ( N i z v y z y u i i i i ∈ − =                                            (10) 
where . 0 ) (   and   0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ > ′ z v z v i i  The subscripts in the functions  i i v g   and   capture the fact 
that the agents are not necessarily identical. 
 
Given a coalitional structure ) , , , ( 2 1 m S S S P K = , let  ) ~ ..., , ~ , ~ ( 2 1 n e e e be the corresponding 
coalitional equilibrium. Then from the first order conditions  
 
                                          . ,..., 2 , 1 , , ) ~ ( ) ~ ( m j S i e v e g j
S lN k
k l i i
j
= ∈ ′ = ′ ∑∑
∈∈
                               (11) 
  
     Lemma 3: Suppose the agents are not identical. Let ) 1 , , 1 , 1 , ( K S P = be some 
coalition structure and let  , , , ( 2 1 T T S P = ′  ) , m T K be a coalition structure such that 
1 > k T for at least some  } , , 2 , 1 { m k K ∈ . Then,  ) ( ) ( P u P u i i > ′ for all  . S i∈  
 
     Proof of Lemma 3: Let ) ˆ , , ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1 n e e e K  and  ) , , , ( 2 1 n e e e ′ ′ ′ K  be the coalitional equilibrium 
strategies corresponding to P P ′   and   , respectively. Let  .   and   ˆ ˆ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈




i e z e z We claim 
that  . ˆ z z < ′  Suppose not, i.e., let  . ˆ z z ≥ ′ Then, as seen from (11), convexity of each  l v  and 
m j Tj , , 2 , 1 each  for    1 K = ≥ , imply that   i i e e ˆ ≤ ′  for each  k i i T i e e N i ∈ < ′ ∈ each  for    ˆ      and   
such that  . 1 > k T But this contradicts our supposition that  . ˆ z z ≥ ′ Hence  i i e e z z ˆ   and   ˆ ≥ ′ < ′  
for each  S i∈ . But this proves the lemma as this means   ) ( ) ( P u P u i i > ′  for  . S i∈  
 
Furthermore, as shown in Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997),
12 there exists an imputation 
) , , , ( 2 1 n x x x K  possibly involving transfers among the members of the grand coalition 
such that for all   , ), 1 , , 1 , 1 , ( N S S P ⊂ = K   
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑







i P u x N u x ). (   and   ) (
S i
 
                                                 
12 See also Helms (2001).   16
This means that if, as in the symmetric case, the deviating coalition S  presumes          
that  S N \  will break up into singletons, then it will have no incentive to engage in the 




The purpose of this paper is not to review the coalition formation theory, but to justify in 
terms of this theory the γ - core and its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is 
stable. Some comparisons are however unavoidable. This has reference to the fact that 
the γ -theory has been developed and applied to asymmetric games whereas the coalition 
formation theory has been shown to be applicable to only symmetric games. For 
example, if the players are not identical, what would be the equilibrium coalition 
structure in our game with three players after  } 3 { deviates? Since the payoffs of the 
players across the coalitions can no longer be compared, the coalition formation theory is 
unable to make any prediction in such cases.
13 It is therefore reasonable to assume that in 
asymmetric games the deviating coalitions are also not able to predict the coalition 
structure subsequent to their deviations. In the face of such uncertainty, a coalition may 
deviate only if its members would benefit in all subsequent coalition structures. But this 
is precisely the assumption underlying the γ -core, as Lemma 3 shows for the asymmetric 
case that the payoffs of the members of the deviating coalition S are minimized when 
S N \  breaks up into singletons.
14   
 
We have restricted our analysis to a class of games that imply positive externalities from 
coalition formation. For games with negative externalities, the corresponding assumption 
underlying the γ -characteristic function is that S assumes that the coalition N \ S would 
form and its members would adopt the best response joint strategies. We however do not 
pursue this here as it is the subject matter of another paper. 
                                                 
13 An additional complication is that of transfers among the members of a coalition, which has also not 
been satisfactorily resolved in the coalition formation theory for asymmetric games. 
14 It also clarifies that it is transfers among the members of the grand coalition and not among the members 
of the deviating coalitions that play an important role.    17
Overall, our analysis shows that in order to obtain stability of coalition structures other 
than the grand coalition or the efficient coalition structure one must either invoke the 
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